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Scholars have long debated whether welfare policymaking in industrialized democracies 
is responsive to citizen preferences and whether such policymaking is more 
responsive to rich than to poor citizens. Debate has been hampered, however, 
by difficulties in matching data on attitudes toward particular policies to data on 
changes in the generosity of actual policies. This article uses better, more targeted 
measures of policy change that allow more valid exploration of responsiveness for 
a significant range of democracies. It does so by linking multicountry and multiwave 
survey data on attitudes toward health, pension, and unemployment policies and data 
on actual policy generosity, not just spending, in these domains. The analysis reveals 
that attitudes correlate strongly with subsequent changes in welfare generosity in the 
three policy areas and that such responsiveness is much stronger for richer than for 
poorer citizens. Representation is likely real but also vastly unequal in the welfare 
politics of industrialized democracies.
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The quality of democratic representation in policymaking, including in welfare state 
policy, remains a source of enduring and fundamental controversy in developed 
democracies. A key debate involves the extent to which attitudes of citizens on issues 
of welfare state reform actually constrain or impel policymakers to alter existing 
social policies in line with citizens’ wants. Some studies find solid links between 
opinion and policy;1 others have found links either to be unclear, because data limita-
tions constrain causal inference about such links, or to be weak, because real politics 
block any simple aggregation of citizen preferences into policy change.2 A second, 
related debate concerns inequality in political representation. Recent studies, particu-
larly of the United States, find that the average voter and certainly poorer citizens 
have much less influence on subsequent policy changes than wealthier citizens do.3 
The principal controversy, here, is whether such unequal democracy applies to key 
features of the welfare state and extends to settings outside the United States, where 
traditions and more inclusive institutions of governance might yield more equitable 
political representation.
Both debates about representation in welfare policymaking remain unresolved, in 
part because of serious empirical constraints. Among the most significant has been the 
difficulty of matching valid and systematic measures of citizen attitudes toward par-
ticular social policy reforms to measures of downstream change in social policy regu-
lations sufficient to support meaningful causal inferences about representation. The 
most careful existing studies have linked attitudinal patterns of particular groups to 
change or incidence of policy in subsequent years.4 But even those studies work with 
very rough measures of policy change, such as changes in government spending. Such 
measures are likely to suffer from what is known as the “dependent variable problem,” 
where spending metrics do not fully coincide with regulatory and legislative changes 
in social policies about which citizens actually express preferences. Large shifts in 
spending per capita can and do swing free of actual policy changes—for instance, 
when entitlement spending rises with higher take-up during economic downturns.
In this article we partially overcome such empirical challenges by matching the 
attitudes regarding social policy of (various) segments of a population to better esti-
mates of change in the actual generosity of such policy. The former we accomplish by 
focusing on several waves of the multicountry International Social Science Program 
(ISSP) and its questions about the provision of social policy with respect to unemploy-
ment, pensions, and healthcare. The data provide leverage to measure support for these 
features of the welfare state validly and reliably, across respondents’ household 
incomes, for a considerable cross-section of countries and period of time. Equally 
important, we match these data to measures of changes in the programmatic generosity 
of the same policy areas, relying on generosity measures from the Comparative 
Welfare Entitlements Database (CWED).5
On the basis of such empirical improvements, our principal expectations are two-
fold. First, we expect that attitudes, on average, are associated with measures of sub-
sequent policy generosity, even if such attitudes are less associated with subsequent 
spending. Second, we expect that wealthier citizens influence actual social policy 
development more strongly than do poorer citizens, on the grounds that wealthier 
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citizens find both formal and informal footholds for pressuring policy change. Our 
study supports these hypotheses in a range of models, specifications, and estimators 
linking individual attitudes to subsequent changes in generosity related to unemploy-
ment, pensions, and healthcare. We provide evidence that citizen preferences are not 
expressed in vain but tend to show up in subsequent shifts in the policy provisions of 
welfare states. However, not all citizens are equal in political expression. The poorest 
tend to have no statistically significant influence on subsequent policy changes, 
whereas the wealthiest do. The political economy of welfare state reform in industrial-
ized democracies can thus best be characterized as manifesting real but unequal repre-
sentation for its citizens.
(Unequal) Representation in Welfare State Policymaking?
Long-standing debate among policymakers, activists, and academics of all disciplin-
ary and methodological stripes concerns the degree and character of political represen-
tation of broad publics and citizen attitudes in the actual development of the welfare 
state. The debate involves two related controversies.
One controversy questions the extent to which policymaking is responsive to the 
political demands of citizens.6 In developed democracies, some modicum of represen-
tation should be broadly present, but in welfare state policymaking and elsewhere that 
presence is far from obvious. On the one hand, plenty of research supports the intuition 
that public opinion tends to translate into policy change. James Stimson, Michael 
Mackuen, and Robert Erikson, for instance, highlight two electoral mechanisms link-
ing citizen preferences and policy outcomes: electoral turnover, an indirect pathway 
flowing from citizen preferences to election outcomes and from election outcomes to 
policy; and political actors anticipating electoral defeat and adapting to public prefer-
ences so as to avoid it.7 Beyond the electoral arena, organized interests such as unions, 
employer associations, nongovernmental organizations, and civic associations can 
serve as channels by which public attitudes influence policy outcomes.8 These mecha-
nisms can give life to the role of the median voter in spatial theories of voting9 or to 
various strains of pluralism in policymaking.10 Empirically, many scholars have found 
evidence of such representation. For many polities and policy areas, studies have 
unearthed (causal or associational) links between public opinion and aggregate policy 
outputs in democracies.11
On the other hand, much scholarship questions these findings. Some scholars 
have judged citizen attitudes to be so diffuse and vague, or vaguely known, as to be 
very blunt instruments in policymaking.12 Important critiques of pluralism, further, 
have articulated why popular positions are blocked, where politics is the province 
of organized special-interest groups, lobbies, and elites in areas including social 
policymaking.13 A related view emphasizes the relative autonomy of the state, where 
the prerogatives of state actors and institutions eclipse the pressure of citizen-voters 
for welfare state policies.14 Consistent with these critiques is empirical skepticism 
that views any association between citizen attitudes and aggregate policy outcomes 
as (spurious) correlation rather than causation.15
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A second and related debate concerns whether there is income inequality in repre-
sentation. A long tradition of Marxian and other left-wing critiques of pluralism, for 
instance, has explored the extent to which wealth confers political privilege.16 Welfare 
state scholars have studied how economic privilege can increase political influence, 
a view that sits comfortably with the power-resources tradition of welfare state 
research.17 Most important, perhaps, has been work on disfunctions of democracy in 
the United States. Pioneering studies by Martin Gilens, Larry Bartels, and others find 
evidence that the attitudes of the wealthiest citizens are more reflected in subsequent 
policy shifts than the attitudes of median or poorer citizens.18 Here we see that the rich 
(e.g., the ninetieth percentile of the income distribution) get their way more than the 
poor (e.g., the tenth percentile) or middle-class citizens (e.g., the fiftieth percentile) in 
many policy areas, including social policy. The sources of such inequality can be 
structural or instrumental.19 They include money in electoral politics;20 the breakdown 
of organized public interests, particularly unions;21 and underrepresentation of lower-
class interests in political office and elite positions.22 Other scholars have found 
income-based inequalities in representation in cross-national contexts, although the 
evidence is still scarce.23 Recent work has explored how attitudes across the income 
spectrum relate to subsequent changes in welfare state spending, revealing in a cross-
section of countries modest skews in favor of the wealthiest citizens.24
Some scholars, however, contend that the wealthiest citizens are not necessarily 
better represented in social policymaking than their poorer counterparts. The pluralist 
perspective expects that policy can be influenced by almost any segment of the income 
spectrum, by virtue of political engagement through groupings such as religious orga-
nizations, unions, or poor people’s movements.25 Recent empirical research suggest-
ing that middle-class, median-income citizens often agree with their richest counterparts 
paints a portrait of less unequal representation.26
Progress or partial resolution of both debates is constrained by important limits on 
the empirical work informing these debates. A first problem is that the research designs 
linking survey data to data on policy outcomes have limited degrees of freedom and 
variation over time, which severely hampers causal inferences. An attractive strategy 
has been to pool many surveys within a single country, linking variation in opinions 
across time and issues to subsequent policy changes. But this strategy limits variation 
in welfare state policymaking and between polities—beyond the United States, for 
example, with its distinctive institutions and historical legacies. Yet cross-national 
comparisons have focused on (at most) country-year observations and policy output in 
levels, in very limited pairings that lack sufficient control for inferential threats such 
as endogeneity and omitted-variable bias.
Endogeneity is particularly problematic in such research.27 There are strong theo-
retical and empirical reasons to expect welfare policy outcomes to influence attitudes 
toward welfare states and not just the other way around.28 Specifying the dependent 
variable in levels allows only very summary techniques to redress possible reverse 
causation (e.g., Hausman tests, as in Brooks and Manza,29 and modeling some lag 
between attitudes and subsequent policy output). By this logic, a few scholars have 
provided significant improvements by focusing on multicountry survey material 
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matched to subsequent spending changes,30 including welfare spending.31 But that 
does constrain the observations available to estimate within and between correlation 
between attitudes and policy change.
A second empirical shortcoming involves the weak concordance between the sub-
stance of attitudes and of political outcomes. Some studies look for correlation between 
attitudes about broadly described welfare provisions and policy efforts—say, total 
social expenditures and transfers. Given the differences in politics governing different 
welfare state policies (e.g., pensions versus unemployment insurance), such combina-
tions are very rough.
A bigger problem, however, is that even the best studies matching attitudes to 
particular social policy efforts have focused on spending measures of such efforts. 
This allows substantial coverage over time, countries, and social policy dimensions, 
but it suffers from what the social policy literature has dubbed the “dependent vari-
able problem.”32 This problem is “a noticeable absence of reflection on how to con-
ceptualize, operationalize and measure change within welfare states.”33 As Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen bluntly put it, “It’s difficult to imagine that anyone struggled for 
spending per se.”34 Indeed, even citizens saying they want to increase spending on 
social policy protections are in all likelihood saying they want to improve the level of 
social protection. Changes in spending reflect many developments other than the 
generosity of such protection, for instance higher unemployment in downturns that 
can increase spending even if actual protection and insurance stay the same or drop. 
As James Allan and Lyle Scruggs point out, “As long as the percentage growth of 
dependents in a program (e.g., the unemployed) exceeds the percentage per capita 
reduction in benefits, aggregate social spending will be higher.”35 The problem is 
doubly perverse in studies that look at spending as a share of GDP, where macroeco-
nomic downturns mean a drop in the denominator of measures of welfare effort.36
More direct measures of benefit generosity would make much more sense. One 
might focus on net replacement rates, as in data gathered by the OECD and else-
where,37 or composites that also gauge other aspects of generosity, such as eligibility, 
waiting times, and duration. Such measures in fact exist, such as Esping-Andersen’s 
“decommodification” measures or the more refined composites developed by Scruggs 
and colleagues in the CWED.38 To date, however, such measures have not been 
explored in relation to political representation.39
Approach and Hypotheses
We address major shortcomings in the study of policy responsiveness by matching 
high-quality survey data gauging support for particular welfare policies to high-qual-
ity country-year data on such policies in subsequent years. These data improve our 
leverage in addressing controversies about both general representation and unequal 
representation in social policy spending and generosity. To guide our analysis, we 
focus on four hypotheses.
Our first two hypotheses concern whether citizen attitudes in the aggregate influence 
welfare policymaking. Although changes in public sentiments may require significant 
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time to play out in political life, the many mechanisms linking citizen wants to legisla-
tive and executive functions in any democratic party-system ought to yield a positive 
connection between public opinions and subsequent policy changes.
Hypothesis 1a: The mean or median level of citizen support for a given aspect of 
welfare policy reform in a given country and year should correlate positively with 
subsequent policy change in that country.
The focus here is on subsequent change in policy effort, as opposed to levels of policy 
outcomes, since we want to gauge whether citizen support for more or less protection 
yields subsequent retrenchment or expansion in policy provisions. What “subsequent” 
means is an uncertain empirical issue concerning how long it takes for citizen senti-
ments expressed in a given year to percolate into political pressure and policy change. 
Note also that the hypothesis encompasses all democratic settings and all social pol-
icy dimensions. One might expect public attitudes to correlate with policy develop-
ments more strongly in some countries than others or with respect to some faces of 
social policy more than others. But we do not have strong theoretical priors on these 
issues and treat differences across countries and aspects of social policy as empirical 
questions.
What is crucial to this hypothesis (and those below) is that we compare attitudes on 
a given policy and country to subsequent changes within that same policy and country. 
Indeed, attitudes might vary across faces of social policy in any given country and at 
any given time. For instance, in a given country and year, citizens might support 
increased or more generous unemployment-related social benefits but the opposite 
with respect to pension benefits. Our first hypothesis then would imply policy expan-
sion with respect to unemployment-related benefits and the opposite with respect to 
pension benefits. These results can also be pooled across policy areas, such that 
Hypothesis 1a predicts a general pattern of (net) representation.
Our second expectation is that a distinction should be made between subsequent 
change in social policy spending as opposed to change in measures of generosity. 
Citizen attitudes are likely to be more vague and less strongly felt with respect to broad 
spending measures than to actual generosity in policy-program benefits; recall Esping-
Andersen’s quip that no one agitates for spending per se. In any event, changes in 
spending reflect economic and conjuncture-related developments and circumstances 
separate from the substance of social policy benefits; as noted above, in many macro-
economic conditions, spending on a program will rise or fall even if the substantive 
benefits provided do not change or are altered in the opposite direction to spending 
shifts. In contrast, changes in substantive policy generosity directly capture provisions 
and benefits that can be accessed (or not) by citizens and should reflect, in a way less 
muddied by background economic developments, citizen attitudes about and policy 
choices toward social policy. Such reasoning supports a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: The mean or median level of citizen support for a given aspect of 
welfare policy reform in a given country and year should correlate more positively 
with subsequent change in benefit generosity than in spending in that country.
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The remaining hypotheses concern our second controversy about inequality in 
political representation. We take seriously the unresolved character of this contro-
versy, but we expect some inequality in representation in line with earlier scholar-
ship on the best-studied patterns in US experience. Differences in representation in 
non-US political systems might dampen the kinds of income-based differences in 
representation that have been unearthed in the US context. But even in more inclu-
sive democratic systems, with better representation in social policymaking, wealth-
ier citizens have more information, cognitive advantages in engaging politics, ties to 
elite networks, and structural power as investors and employers.40 These consider-
ations underlie our main expectation of income inequality of representation in social 
policymaking:
Hypothesis 2a: Support among high-income citizens for a given aspect of welfare 
policy reform in a given country and year should correlate more positively with 
subsequent change in that country than does support among low-income citizens.
This hypothesis does not specify “high income” and “low income.” We treat these also 
as empirical questions, focusing on various measurements as explained below. The 
hypothesis also does not specify a priori that high- and low-income citizens should 
take different positions. Of course, high-income citizens are usually disproportionate 
net contributors to social policy, and low-income citizens disproportionate net benefi-
ciaries, such that wealthier individuals likely prefer less expansion and more contrac-
tion in welfare generosity than do their poorer counterparts.41 But that the attitudes of 
the rich should have more policy traction than the attitudes of the poor is orthogonal to 
our focus on actual representation. More relevant is that differences in representation 
may show up only when rich and poor attitudes clearly diverge, a possibility we 
explore empirically below.
As with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we expect that representation of high- and of low-
income citizens does not play out for spending in the same way as for benefit generos-
ity. We expect some inequality in political representation, however welfare effort is 
measured. But for the reasons articulated above—that attitudes focus more on the 
substance of benefits than on spending per se and that spending reflects macroeco-
nomic shifts as much as the substance of benefits—inequalities in representation 
should show up more strongly in subsequent changes in social benefit generosity than 
in spending. Hence our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: With respect to reform or change in benefit generosity more than 
in spending, support among high-income citizens for a given aspect of welfare 
policy reform in a given country and year should correlate more strongly positively 
with subsequent change in that country than does support among low-income 
citizens.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are, like Hypotheses 1a and 1b, general with respect to the 
timing of subsequent change or the countries or aspects of welfare state policy where 
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unequal representation is hypothesized to emerge. Differences across time-lags in 
policy change, between countries, or across faces of social policy are empirical ques-
tions for our analysis.
Data and Methods
To analyze the hypotheses above, we combine multiple data sets on citizen attitudes 
with multiple data sets on policy changes. The combination reveals matched empirical 
variation in both attitudes toward welfare state development and in closely related 
policy outputs with respect to spending and generosity—all across distinct topics or 
aspects of welfare policy, across a substantial cross-section of countries, and across 
multiple time periods. Such data allow us to explore the association between a particu-
lar group’s expressed preference for more or less of a particular aspect of welfare 
policy in a given country and year, on the one hand, and the subsequent change in 
policy generosity for that same aspect of policy within the same country-year, on the 
other hand.
Independent Variables: Citizen Support for Welfare State Provisions
Citizen attitudes are gathered from a single multicountry, multiwave data set, the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) time-series cross-section data, in particu-
lar the ISSP’s repeated Role of Government modules, included in four waves so far 
(in 1985, 1990, 1996, and 2006). These modules contain questions on social policy 
preferences. The most useful repeated questions ask respondents whether they want 
to see more or less government spending in areas of welfare policy protection,42 and 
we then use the questions about three areas in particular: pensions, unemployment, 
and healthcare.
The repeated questions have several benefits for our exploration. They yield broad 
coverage spanning a relatively long time period, substantial trends in welfare state 
policymaking, and a range of democratic polities in North America, Europe, and Asia. 
In addition, they address well-defined arenas of social policy about which citizens can 
be expected to have opinions, and they are phrased in terms of changes relative to a 
status quo: whether respondents want more or less spending on unemployment, pen-
sion programs, or health. Although a nominal focus on spending is ambiguous, it con-
notes level of generosity (even if actual changes in spending need not covary with 
actual policy generosity in terms of accessibility or benefits provided). For lay citizens 
confronted with such a survey question, more complicated fiscal calculation is much 
less likely than a simple judgment of whether the substantive program should be more 
or less generous in its benefits and conditionality relative to the existing generosity of 
benefits. The survey questions gauge support for generosity or program size relative to 
the status quo ante and can be matched to subsequent changes in actual spending or 
metrics of generosity.
To gauge preferences for increased or decreased welfare provisions at different 
levels of the income distribution, we first recoded the answer categories such that 
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strongly agreeing to an increase in spending was given a score of 100; agreeing was 
scored 50; neither agreeing nor disagreeing was scored 0; disagreeing was scored −50; 
and strongly disagreeing was given a score of −100.43 Since the precise position of low 
and high incomes is somewhat arbitrary, we focus on four different but common con-
ceptions of “low versus high” income: the first versus third terciles, the first versus 
fifth quintiles, the tenth versus ninetieth percentiles, and the fifth versus ninety-fifth 
percentiles.
Our measurement of attitudes across levels of income relies on ISSP measures of 
household income. These income measures are not without their problems, mainly 
arising from variation in question wording across participating countries. Some coun-
tries ask for gross income and others ask for net income; some ask for monthly income 
and others ask for annual income; and some describe sources of income in the question 
whereas others do not.44 This diversity complicates comparisons of the same income 
groups across countries. For the study of inequalities in representation, however, the 
obstacle is modest, because we compare rich and poor within the same country in a 
standardized way—a comparison that should not be biased by differences in the 
income question. We expect the measure systematically and meaningfully to capture 
how different income segments in a country-year perceive social policy relative to one 
another.45
To gauge general spending preferences, we focus on two measures: the preference 
of respondents at the fiftieth income percentile and the average preference of all 
respondents combined; the latter is not dependent on the survey’s income measures. 
For our measures across the income spread of the ISSP samples, we calculate scores at 
the various percentiles by regressing the recoded questions on household income and 
its squared term (using probability weights) and taking the resulting predicted scores 
at the indicated points in the income distribution. This approach follows Gilens46 and 
addresses the fact that different ISSP countries have different income categorizations.
To give a descriptive overview of our opinion measures, Figure 1 presents the sam-
ple means for the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth income percentiles pooled across all 
sampled countries. Clear and expected differences are revealed between low and high 
incomes: low-income respondents want more generous social policies than high-
income respondents. Also, general demand for increased welfare effort is most pro-
nounced for healthcare and pensions. In the case of unemployment, high-income 
respondents wish to see slightly less spending or welfare effort, low incomes wish to 
see slightly more, and the mean for the fiftieth percentile (as well as the overall mean) 
is close to zero. Comparing the different policy areas also shows that the differences 
between low and high incomes are largest for unemployment (twenty-eight percentage 
points between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles) and pensions (twenty-three per-
centage points) and smaller for healthcare (thirteen percentage points).
Dependent Variables: Changes in Spending and in Generosity Outcomes
Our dependent variables consist of policy changes regarding the welfare state. One set 
of measures involves changes in government spending on healthcare, pensions, and 
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unemployment—measured separately so as to be matched to the specific breakdown 
of the ISSP questions—and with the spending measures taken per capita.47 We focus 
on public and mandatory private spending in 2010 US dollars and purchasing power 
parity. Our second set of measures is based on the CWED and addresses substantive 
policy generosity.48 The CWED contains several measures of welfare state replace-
ment rates, benefit duration, benefit eligibility, and coverage or take-up rates with 
regard to sickness, pensions, and unemployment. Improving on Esping-Andersen’s 
concept of decommodification, the CWED combines these measures into indices of 
welfare state generosity for each of three policy areas: pensions, unemployment, and 
sickness. We look at precisely these policy-specific measures of generosity because 
they parallel the spending measures and can be matched to the ISSP questions about 
pensions, unemployment, and healthcare. The fit between the ISSP survey topics and 
the CWED generosity topics is one-to-one for pensions and unemployment assistance. 
But the overlap is less than one-to-one for healthcare and sickness: the ISSP questions 
address healthcare, whereas the CWED focuses on sickness provisions—the former 
being a broader palette of provisions. Still, sickness benefits are an important compo-
nent of healthcare and can plausibly proxy for the broader realm of health policy. But 
our analysis, both pooled and disaggregated by topic, allows us to explore these issues 
empirically.
We operationalize policy outcomes by focusing on changes in spending and in 
generosity, in these particular areas, that can then be paired to the ISSP questions about 
Figure 1. Mean Spending Preferences of Low and High Incomes by Policy Area.
Note: Error bars indicate one standard error above and below the mean.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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healthcare, pensions, and unemployment. We focus on changes rather than levels 
because we are interested in how attitudes about reform relate to subsequent reform, 
both of which involve changes, not levels. In particular, we are exploring whether the 
political system responds to attitudes about welfare policy change (our explanatory 
variable of interest), not about a general level or kind of social policy form. And 
whether there is responsiveness to such attitudes should be gauged not in terms of the 
status quo ante level of policy but in terms of reform, expansion, or retrenchment rela-
tive to a status quo ante—hence, a change.
Therefore, if respondents express a preference for increased spending, and in the 
years after the survey was conducted the policy becomes more generous, we take this 
change as evidence of representation for that group or person. Equally, we see represen-
tation in situations where a group expresses preference for decreases and policy 
becomes less generous in subsequent years. We have no strong a priori reasons to pre-
sume that it takes a particular time for public positioning to translate (or not) into actual 
policy or political changes. The baseline models look at the average change in the four 
years following the survey for each feature of social policy. For unemployment insur-
ance (UI), for instance, the baseline measure of average change is [(UI(t + 1) − UIt ) + 
(UI(t + 2) − UIt ) + (UI(t + 3) − UIt ) + (UI(t + 4) − UIt )] / 4.49 As robustness checks, we 
consider other time periods.
The correlation between changes in spending per capita and changes in generosity is 
not strong—unsurprising, given that spending patterns reflect not just substantive pol-
icy orientation but also macroeconomic developments with no clear relation to such 
orientation. The overall correlation is 0.20, varying from 0.08 for healthcare to 0.50 for 
pensions. The correlation between levels of spending and levels of generosity is not 
much higher (r = 0.26).50 According to the CWED-based measures, the most generous 
countries in terms of benefit levels are those known to have an extensive welfare state: 
Norway and Sweden, followed by the Netherlands and Finland. The Anglo-Saxon and 
Asian countries are at the bottom. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries are in 
the middle of the pack in spending per capita, joined by the United States and Japan. 
For any judgment of representation over modest periods of time, however, it is changes 
in generosity or spending that matter, not simple background levels.
Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the country-means of the average change in gener-
osity in the four years following the survey.51 All variation across time and issue areas 
(unemployment, pensions, healthcare/sickness) is smoothed over, but the substantial 
variation between countries is summarized. The welfare state clearly becomes more 
generous in some countries (South Korea, Portugal) and less generous in others 
(Sweden) by the CWED benefit-generosity metric. The trends broken out by policy 
area (not shown) vary somewhat, underscoring the importance of estimating not just 
the pooled composite but also area-specific models.
Bringing these data together to match measures on attitudes to measures on policy 
changes allows one to judge the extent to which citizen support for welfare expansion 
(retrenchment) is translated into actual policy expansion (or rollbacks). This exercise 
can be imagined in terms of broad country-level differences in a given policy area, 
where one looks at, say, the attitudes of the wealthiest ninetieth percentile toward 
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unemployment protection in relation to subsequent policy change in such protection.52 
For our full exploration, however, we want to exploit the more fine-grained character 
of our data: valid measures of attitudes toward welfare policy change and actual sub-
sequent policy change for a given country-topic-year. Thus we can measure policy 
attitudes and subsequent policy change for a citizen group (e.g., median-income group 
vs. poorest vs. richest) in a given country with respect to a given welfare-policy topic 
for a given year. Substantial leverage is provided to gauge the responsiveness of pol-
icy to group demands on issues of welfare policymaking.
To get the most out of this leverage, our baseline analysis focuses on a pooling of 
all the information for a given country-topic-year. Pooling is possible so long as we 
focus on how the expressed attitudes for a given country-topic-year relate to subse-
quent policy change for that same country-topic-year. And such pooling is meaningful 
because the policy measures are based on standardized measures of group attitudes 
and of subsequent policy development. The attitudes are gauged by standardized sur-
vey answers within a single survey instrument (ISSP), and the outcomes focus on 
standardized changes in spending or generosity: for spending, we look at changes in 
expenditures per capita; and for generosity, we look at changes in z-score composites 
Figure 2. Average Change in Welfare State Generosity in the Years following the ISSP.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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of generosity. Hence, one can compare an association (or lack of association) between 
group attitudes and subsequent policy for a given group-country-topic-year with the 
association (or lack of association) between group attitudes and policy for another 
group-country-topic-year. The principal advantage of such pooling is twofold: it 
allows us to paint a broad portrait of responsiveness in the welfare state, and it yields 
sufficient degrees of freedom to include substantial country-year controls without 
excessive collinearity, thereby facilitating more valid econometric estimation of 
responsiveness.
Although the full pooling of observations provides the most complete view of repre-
sentation in social policymaking, one can also look at particular subsets of the data. 
Doing so is meaningful, however, only to the extent that the data include sufficient 
variation on a given dimension to allow comparisons and statistical control without 
excessive multicollinearity between parameters estimated. Within such constraints, our 
data provide sufficient country-year variation to allow meaningful analysis of respon-
siveness with respect to individual topics or aspects of social policy—that is, judging 
the extent of representation for either UI, or pension provisions, or health/sickness 
(where the unit of analysis is country-year for each of these policy areas). The downside 
of focusing on a single policy realm is that the data are more constrained in degrees of 
freedom, but there is enough variation for meaningful analysis to clarify how respon-
siveness might vary by aspect of social policy. Unfortunately, the data are more con-
strained for exploring variation within a particular country. Ideally, one could also focus 
on topic-year variation within a given country—but such variation is modest enough to 
generate prohibitively high multicollinearity between variables. In other words, in the 
currently available comparable data, the “between” variation across countries and top-
ics is much more substantial than the “within” data across time (or across topics within 
a given country). One can say less than one would like about the role of institutions 
where most variation is between rather than within countries. Nonetheless, our analyses 
below do consider and discuss such specifications focused on institutional and other 
possible country-level factors. And what is more fundamental, all the models presented 
below consider country-level clustering—for example, through country-level random 
intercepts.
Looking at either the full country-topic-year variation or the country-year variation 
for a given topic, hence, we follow an estimation strategy to generate valid inferences 
about how attitudes relate to subsequent policy reform. The strategy involves estima-
tion of representation that controls for possible confounding factors, those that corre-
late with both the measured citizen attitudes and changes in welfare state effort. To 
control for the “thermostat-model” possibility that past policy may influence subse-
quent attitudes, we include the ex ante level of social policy generosity (matched to 
each country-topic-year).53 Other controls include GDP per capita (measured in con-
stant 2010 US dollars) in a country, annual growth in GDP per capita per country, 
unemployment rate, and dummies for both the policy area and survey wave. To address 
omitted-variable bias, our baseline focuses on these controls measured at time t rather 
than later periods.54
Equally important, our specifications of estimators and clustering support meaning-
ful causal inferences about general and unequal representation in the light of common 
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threats to such inference. To highlight such inferences, we look at three sets of speci-
fications. The first set pools the three areas of policy (unemployment, pensions, and 
healthcare), focusing in our baseline on two-level random intercept models—country-
topic-year (level 1) and country (level 2)—thereby explicitly taking account of the 
possible country-level clustering of policymaking experience. For these models, we 
include dummies for survey waves and the policy topics (health policy as excluded 
dummy).
The second set of baseline specifications disaggregates the three policy topics, 
focusing on two-level random intercept models—country-year (level 1) and, again to 
address the country-level clustering, country (level 2) for each policy area. For both 
the pooled and disaggregated models, we test for general representation by focusing 
on the median or overall opinion (in separate models). And we test for unequal repre-
sentation by focusing in our baseline estimations on the roles of low- and of high-
income attitudes in a single model, so as to consider their relative correlation with 
subsequent policy change. This is the simplest way to address how rich and poor might 
have distinct effects, the one having an association controlling for the influence of the 
other.55 For all these models, further, the coefficients are ordinary least squares, with 
robust-cluster standard errors (clustered by country, the level 2 variable) to address 
remaining country-specific correlation of errors and heteroscedasticity of errors.
Finally, a third set of specifications focuses on important alternatives to these 
pooled and disaggregated baseline models. These alternative specifications include 
different measures of unequal representation, such as direct measures of arithmetic 
differences between the attitudes of the rich and the poor. But the alternative models 
also include different specifications with respect to controls, embedding of the multi-
level data, and alternative estimators.
Findings: Real and Unequal Representation
We present our findings taking each of the three sets of estimations in turn. We shall 
devote the most attention to our first set of estimates, the baseline pooled results. We 
lay out in our discussion not only the basic quantitative results, in the next subsection, 
but also some historical examples drawn from those results in the following subsec-
tion. In view of the space constraints, the remaining two estimation steps involve mini-
mal discussion in text of the policy-specific subsamples (“Disaggregated Results,” 
below) and of various alternative specifications, such as addressing additional coun-
try-level controls (“Alternative Specifications,” below). We hence signal the basics 
and relegate the fuller results to supporting material.
Baseline Pooled Results
Table 1 presents the results of pooled estimation (country-topic-year) of changes in 
CWED generosity of unemployment, pensions, and health/sickness provisions. The 
random intercept models use as the dependent variable the average change in welfare 
generosity in the four years following the survey—allowing direct testing of Hypotheses 
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1a and 2a. Before turning to the variables of interest, note that most control variables 
have little discernible effect on changes in welfare state generosity, although such con-
trols do perform in expected directions and are close to significance in some specifica-
tions (e.g., looking at unemployment and pensions, as opposed to healthcare). The most 
significant controls are the dummies for the different policy areas (unemployment and, 
to a lesser extent, pensions), suggesting that the four-year change in generosity was 
more positive in those areas than in healthcare. The dummy for the second wave of the 
ISSP (around 1990) also has a significant, positive effect, while the generosity level has 
a slightly negative effect.
Most important, the main results corroborate Hypotheses 1a and 2a. With respect to 
Hypothesis 1a on general representation, both measures of overall preferences—the 
Table 1. Random Intercept Models of Changes in Welfare State Generosity (Average 
Change from T + 1 to T + 4 relative to T).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
































































































































































Wald χ2 57.16 46.63 51.09 49.12 71.92 55.44
N 130 130 130 130 130 130
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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median and full-sample mean—have substantial and significant positive effects on 
changes in welfare state generosity. For instance, an increase in overall spending pref-
erences of one standard deviation (24.27) increases the change in generosity by 1.27 
points, about a third of its standard deviation. Welfare reform is clearly, by this reckon-
ing, anchored in citizen demands.
With respect to Hypothesis 2a, Models 3–6 suggest a clear pattern of unequal rep-
resentation: each low-income measurement (the fifth percentile, the tenth percentile, 
the lowest quintile, and the lowest tercile) has a negative but generally insignificant 
association with changes in generosity, while each high-income measurement (the 
ninety-fifth percentile, the ninetieth percentile, the highest quintile, and the highest 
tercile) has a positive and significant effect. For instance, an increase in the spending 
preferences of the ninetieth income percentile by one standard deviation (26.63) 
increases the change in generosity by 1.44 points, about 40 percent of its standard 
deviation.
Figure 3 displays the predicted values of our dependent variable by spending 
preferences of the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth income percentiles, corresponding to 
Models 2 and 4 in Table 1.56 Other variables are held at their means. Preferences of 
low-income respondents are thus shown to have no discernable effect on the depen-
dent variable, while the preferences of median and high-income respondents do 
have an effect. Figure 3 illustrates that the standard errors are substantial where the 
limited number of observations yields large confidence intervals. While this high-
lights the need to consider other specifications before drawing conclusions, it is 
clear that the most general baseline estimates focused on generosity support the 
view from Hypotheses 1a and 2a that welfare policymaking entails real but unequal 
representation.
This support for Hypotheses 1a and 2a contrasts with what we see if we turn to 
spending patterns. Table 2 presents how attitudes correlate with our second measure of 
Figure 3. Predicted Values of Changes in Welfare State Generosity by Preferences of Low-, 
Median-, and High-Income Respondents.
Note: Dotted lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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policy change: spending per capita. We run random intercept models using as the 
dependent variable the average change in spending in the four years following the 
survey. The first two models again contain measurements of overall opinion, first via 
the average preferences of all respondents and the second via preferences at the fiftieth 
income percentile. Models 3–6 then focus on the various measures of low and high 
income.
Overall, low-, median-, and high-income preferences never have a clear or signifi-
cant effect on changes in spending. The implication is that income groups are equally 
ignored in their views toward the welfare state. These patterns go against Hypotheses 
1a and 2a, and they tell a different story from that of the generosity measures, even 
when conditions that might underlie the biasing effects of the spending-based measure 
Table 2. Random Intercept Models of Changes in Spending per Capita (Average Change 
from T + 1 to T + 4 relative to T).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6


































































































































































Wald χ2 98.86 90.75 110.37 107.59 104.31 105.83
N 130 130 130 130 130 130
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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(e.g., unemployment rates) are controlled. But of course this contrast with the results 
focused on generosity measures is very much in line with the expectations captured by 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b. We expect macroeconomic conditions and the substantive pol-
icy interests of citizens to render a weaker link between citizen attitudes and spending 
than between citizen attitudes and substantive policy generosity. The contrasting pat-
terns in Tables 1 and 2 support this view.
A final point based on the baseline results: they harbor an important pattern of 
(unequal) representation as being symmetrical, relevant to not only welfare state 
expansion but also retrenchment. Supplemental analysis shows, more generally, that in 
the cases where the positions of wealthy and poorer respondents differ significantly, 
the wealthy tend to win out. In the twenty-seven country-years of UI cases in which 
the ninetieth income percentile mostly favors less unemployment protection, the aver-
age change in generosity is −0.63 percent. And in the sixteen country-years of UI 
observations where the ninetieth percentile mostly favors more unemployment protec-
tion, generosity increases on average by 3.64 percent.57 The full picture from our data, 
hence, suggests real but unequal representation in social policy generosity, although 
not manifested so much in spending patterns.
Historical Examples Drawn from the Baseline Statistics
These various baseline results can be made more concrete by looking briefly at par-
ticular historical examples from our data. In view of space constraints, we look at only 
three examples; they illustrate unequal representation across countries (the United 
Kingdom, South Korea, and Sweden), across social policy areas (UI and pensions), 
and across directions of substantial reform (policy retrenchment and expansion).
The first example from our data set is the highly salient and major retrenchment of 
UI in Great Britain in the 1980s. Remember our data set’s coding of attitudes toward 
increased UI: “strongly supporting” scored as 100; “agreeing” scored as 50; “neither 
agreeing nor disagreeing” scored as 0; “disagreeing” scored as −50; and “strongly 
disagreeing” scored as −100. With such coding, the 1985 ISSP survey for British 
respondents revealed big differences in the attitudes of poor, median, and rich respon-
dents: the tenth percentile scored 36.7 (constituting substantial support for increased 
UI); the fiftieth percentile scored a mere 13.9 (on balance wanting more UI, although 
less than poorer counterparts did); and the ninetieth percentile scored −5.2 (wanting on 
average a decrease in UI). As for actual policy change in Great Britain, our data set 
shows that the subsequent four-year period was marked by a 3.1 percent decrease in 
UI, among the three biggest single-period decreases in unemployment generosity in 
our data.
To put a bit of historical flesh on these bones, recall that this quantitative pattern 
describes an important episode in Thatcher-era British welfare retrenchment. Building 
on reforms that started in 1980 but continued throughout the 1980s, the Thatcher gov-
ernment took advantage of what Paul Pierson called “a considerable gap between the 
lowest and top income groups in support for unemployment benefits,” in which 
wealthy party backers and Tory elites widely embraced the idea that UI “produced a 
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‘why work?’ question” and needed to be scaled back.58 The Thatcher government used 
its substantial parliamentary majority and executive authority to retrench benefits 
repeatedly—among other rollbacks phasing out earnings-related supplements in 1980 
and 1988, lowering replacement rates in 1986, extending disqualification periods in 
1986, tightening contribution conditions in 1988, and shifting the long-term unem-
ployed to the means-tested Supplementary Benefit by 1989. As Anthony Atkinson and 
John Micklewright noted, by the late 1980s the Conservative government had adopted 
no fewer than seventeen significant changes in the Unemployment Benefit, almost all 
unfavorable to benefit recipients.59 Linking this historical interpretation to our statis-
tical analysis, we have a stark case where the rich, in their clear preference for UI 
retrenchment, enjoyed a level of representation in the Thatcher government not 
afforded the median and especially not the poorer electorate who wanted continued 
or expanded UI benefits. As regards generosity, hence, British unemployment policy-
making was marked in the 1980s by clearly unequal representation. Interesting for 
our analysis, and in line with our statistical support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b, the 
pattern in spending in the early to mid-1980s suggests a different story. As Allan and 
Scruggs note, increasing reliance by growing legions of unemployed citizens on 
whatever UI was available in the period meant that “social spending grew during the 
British recession of the early 1980s, even though the Conservative government 
slashed entitlements.”60
A second historical snapshot from our data set concerns UI expansion in South 
Korea in the 2000s. The 2006-South Korea-UI data point in our data set reveals sup-
port for UI expansion of 29.0 for the lowest tenth percentile, 25.9 for the fiftieth 
percentile, and 16.5 for the richest ninetieth percentile. Note that although there is 
clearly a familiar skew across the income spectrum in respondents’ support for UI 
expansion, even the wealthiest respondents preferred UI expansion rather than 
retrenchment. As for actual policy development, South Korean UI started even in 
2006 from a very low level of benefit generosity, as shown by the CWED data, but 
experienced no less than an 11.1 percent increase in generosity score for UI in the 
period between 2007 and 2010 (t + 1 to t + 4 for 2006), among the highest single-
period increases in the data set.
Making such policy changes more concrete, the South Korean Ministry of 
Employment and Labor reports major legislative changes in UI in the period 
between 2006 and 2011. For instance, after 2006 self-employed persons were 
allowed to join the Employment Insurance programs for income protection and job 
skills development, and in 2010–11 premiums were increased from 0.9 percent to 
1.1 percent.61 A distinct South Korean story of representation is revealed, and in 
this particular case it is not necessarily a highly unequal one. But it is certainly one 
where the substantial increase in South Korea’s UI generosity was subsequent to 
support for expansion expressed not only by the median and poorer citizens but also 
by the wealthiest ninetieth percentile (for that matter, the wealthiest ninety-fifth 
percentile of the Korean population). This pattern comports with the history of 
legislative and regulatory reform politics underlying the changes, originating from 
within the labor and finance ministries and not just from social actors. And the 
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chaebol-based employers associations recognized that their workers’ vulnerabili-
ties might necessitate some government support. Employers, for example, sparked 
and tolerated calls for expanding UI as, in part, the price of their explicit lobbying 
for labor-market deregulation.62
A third and final historical example drawn from our baseline models concerns 
Swedish pension-system retrenchment in the 1990s. Our data point for 1996 Swedish 
pensions captures positive citizen support—that is, a preference for expansion in the 
pension system—across the entire income spectrum of Swedes. But the level and una-
nimity of support was sharply declining with respondent income, with a score of 40.5 
for the poorest tenth percentile and 16.1 for the ninetieth percentile (11.7 for the 
ninety-fifth percentile). As for outcomes, our baseline estimate shows that the subse-
quent four years yielded a substantial 7.4 percent decline in CWED-measured gener-
osity of pensions, among the largest retrenchments in our data set. As this retrenchment 
goes against general citizen support for pension expansion, it rates as policy nonrepre-
sentation, mainly for the poorer Swedes most supportive of expansion.
In actual policy history, however, this episode mainly provides further illustration 
of a pattern of unequal representation. The policy reforms after 1996 involved a major 
retrenchment of the Swedish pension system, particularly through the legislated move 
from a flat benefit system and earnings-related supplement toward a defined-benefit 
pay-as-you go system.63 In the details, the reform was regressive beyond what our own 
data captures: whereas prereform pension contributions were borne by employers, 
postreform they were evenly divided between employers and employees; and two-
thirds of Swedes, particularly those working fewer than forty years, would be losers of 
the new index rules, yielding a substantial reduction in redistribution.64 As such, the 
reform clearly did not go against the (more tepid pro-expansion) wishes of the wealthi-
est citizens so much as against the (broader and stronger) wishes of the poorest. In 
Swedish political history, the mobilization behind the pension reform involved a grand 
coalition among social actors and parties. The Swedish Employers Federation (SAF) 
had been calling for some years for radical pension reform on grounds that the old 
system eroded national savings, inflated nonwage labor costs, and reduced incentives 
to work.65 And beyond the sustained support from the center-right and (neo-)liberal 
Moderate Party, Center Party, and Liberals, the center-left Social Democratic Party 
(SAP) and union federation also accepted the reforms as a painful necessity. With the 
costs of the pension system becoming onerous—growing from 4.3 percent of GDP in 
1965 to more than 12.2 percent in 1992—the SAP saw that “retrenchment was a pain-
ful necessity brought on by the economic crisis and an opportunity to preserve the basic 
structure and scope of the pension system by correcting its perceived weaknesses.”66 
These politics may constitute some nonrepresentation generally, but they are certainly 
consistent with our hypothesized unequal representation, with the lower support for 
pension expansion among the wealthy compared to the poor constituting a permissive 
condition for reforms skewed in favor of the demands and interests of wealthier 
Swedes.
These three historical examples provide only the briefest illustration of the broader 
statistical patterns of unequal representation (illustrating Hypotheses 1a and 2a), 
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mainly with respect to generosity rather than spending measures (illustrating further, 
hence, Hypotheses 1b and 2b). They also highlight the importance of considering 
details in the specification of the relationships between income and welfare reform—
starting with the story of each welfare policy realm separately.
Disaggregated Results by Policy Area
We now turn, hence, to the fuller disaggregation of the three policy realms underlying 
these pooled results. We look at the generosity-based results, summarized in Tables 
3–5: pensions (Table 3), unemployment (Table 4), and healthcare/sickness (Table 5). 
These are based on the same specifications as in the pooled results of Table 1, although 
here the data structure is country-year for each issue area, and to conserve space we do 
not report the results for the controls.
The disaggregated results broadly corroborate the pooled generosity-based results 
on the inequality of representation, but they do reveal meaningful cross-issue variation 
with respect to general representation. The differential in responsiveness to low-
income versus high-income groups shows up for each of the three social policy areas. 
A noteworthy difference is that the coefficient for low-income preferences is signifi-
cantly negative in some models for sickness/healthcare (Table 5). The modest degrees 
of freedom demand extra caution in drawing inferences, but such a pattern suggests 
that policymaking yields healthcare changes in the opposite direction to that embraced 
by the poorest citizens. Whatever the interpretation, the analysis suggests unequal rep-
resentation favoring the rich over the poor across the distinct social policy realms of 
pensions, unemployment, and healthcare.
The disaggregated results also suggest that the effects of overall or median prefer-
ences are stronger for pensions and unemployment (Tables 3 and 4, respectively) and 





















































Wald χ2 22.53 23.66 39.23 42.20 36.67 35.70
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two−tailed).
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weaker or nonexistent for healthcare (Table 5).67 This may reflect measurement short-
comings discussed above: that our ISSP measure of healthcare attitudes does not 
match up as fully with the policy-change measure (focused on sickness generosity) as 
do pension and unemployment measures. However, the weaker correlation between 
general attitudes and subsequent healthcare-related policy change might reflect sub-
stantive differences in politics across the issue areas. For instance, health-benefit poli-
tics may be subject to less mass-politics mobilization, aggregating public opinion, or 
to more interest-group lobbying, dampening the influence of public opinion, than 





















































Wald χ2 60.18 61.23 46.88 48.14 40.83 47.74
N 44 44 44 44 44 44
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).





















































Wald χ2 15.98 16.46 20.99 21.26 21.12 26.01
N 44 44 44 44 44 44
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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applies to unemployment or pension policymaking.68 Or perhaps the difference in 
responsiveness reflects variation in salience across issue-country-years proportionate 
to how much a political system responds to the pressure of public opinion.69 
Unfortunately, our data set’s coverage is too limited to allow exploration of these and 
other explanations, something we leave to future research.
We shall not dwell on the spending-based specifications, as they generally yield 
nonsignificant results for each of the policy areas that are very similar to Table 2’s 
pooled results.70 But it is worth reporting that with respect to pensions we do see a 
pattern of real and unequal representation. Attitudes among those in the fiftieth income 
percentile correlate with spending changes in pension programs; the ninetieth percen-
tile correlates particularly strongly (statistically and substantively) while the tenth per-
centile does not. This pattern applies to both spending per capita and spending as a 
percentage of GDP. Significantly, it reflects that pensions are the policy area where the 
change in spending is correlated most strongly with the change in generosity. These 
findings add up to marginally stronger support for Hypotheses 1a and 2a and also 
additional support for Hypotheses 1b and 2b.
Alternative Specifications
Our last set of results involve the most important robustness and sensitivity checks: (1) 
alternative measures of policy changes as dependent variables; (2) different measures 
of support for social policies and inequalities in representation; (3) additional and 
alternative controls that might distinguish the politics of representation between coun-
tries; and (4) alternative estimators and embedding of the analysis of such representa-
tion. We summarize only briefly the most important alternatives, relegating fuller 
discussion and detail to online-only Supplementary Appendices.
A first set of alternative specifications explores different generosity measures 
and different combinations of years of policy change. Most noteworthy is that the 
baseline results, both pooled and disaggregated, hold up to specifications of policy 
generosity looking only at replacement rates of unemployment, pension, and sick-
ness provisions—the components of CWED generosity measures that maximize 
coverage in terms of country-years matched to the ISSP data waves (yielding 161 
country-topic-years, instead of 130 in the pooled baseline).71 Also, changing the 
time period of change to three or five years does not substantially change the 
effects, the former slightly decreasing the effect size of high-income preferences 
and the latter increasing it.72
A second set of tests explores alternative approaches to measuring the attitudes of 
low-income and high-income citizens and the responsiveness of subsequent policy 
change to such attitudes. One alternative approach to the models above is to look at 
the share of respondents who support more spending minus the share of respondents 
who support less spending, for different income groups. The resulting variables cor-
relate strongly with our main independent variables (r = .99) and yield very similar 
results, which is important in addressing the possibility that our reported models 
might inappropriately presume equal distances between answer categories. Another 
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measurement approach for our independent variables would estimate separate models 
for low and high incomes. In these results, high-income preferences have a stronger 
effect than low-income preferences, although in some specifications low-income atti-
tudes also have significant (if lower) influence.73 Unlike the baseline, of course, such 
results take no account of the attitudes of low-income relative to high-income 
respondents.
Yet another alternative specification deserves a bit more attention, because it 
addresses collinearity more fully without throwing away information on low-income 
respondents relative to high-income respondents: rich minus poor, in a given country-
topic-year. Here, more positive (more negative) values capture situations in which 
high-income voters want more (less) welfare expansion than do low-income voters. 
The measure provides leverage to test Hypothesis 2a—that the rich are more influen-
tial than poor respondents. If they are, higher (lower) values of rich-minus-poor—
where wealthier respondents want more increases (lower increases or more decreases) 
in welfare generosity than do their poorer counterparts—should correlate positively 
with actual change in generosity. Table 6 summarizes results of testing this possibility. 
Each cell captures the key result for distinct econometric models (to conserve space, 
full results are not shown).74 The odd rows show results of substituting this difference-
parameter for the low- and high-income parameters in the otherwise identical specifi-
cations from Tables 1 and 3–5. The even rows show results of such substitution plus 
controlling for median-income voters’ support for increased generosity. The results 
broadly corroborate our previous findings that unequal representation shows up more 
for generosity than spending measures.75
A third set of alternative specifications concerns the controls in our analysis. Our 
baseline controls capture the most theoretically relevant sources of omitted-variable 
bias. But we have considered other specifications in terms of measures, lags, and tim-
ing and also extra controls relevant to such bias—such as share of the population over 
sixty-five, ex ante level of general spending, and citizen support for the welfare state 
generally or for austerity.76 None of these dampen the reported effects of overall and 
high-income preferences. Another category of controls involves country-level political 
conditions potentially relevant to representation of citizen attitudes about welfare poli-
cymaking—beyond the country-level factors (e.g., GDP per capita) and country-level 
clustering in all of the specifications discussed in Tables 1–6. These extra controls 
include age and quality of democracy, institutions regulating electoral representation 
(e.g., proportional representation), the strength of left or right parties, and the strength 
of organized social actors (e.g., union density). These conditions often display little 
variation over time. Nevertheless, we considered them both as extra controls and in 
interactions to judge whether any of them might alter the degree to which citizen atti-
tudes influence policy change. None of the runs achieved statistical significance. This 
result can be interpreted as substantive, where our evidence for real but unequal repre-
sentation holds regardless of political-institutional settings. More likely, however, as 
discussed above, the modest variation over time per country makes these very weak 
tests of institutional and political conditions in the politics of representation in welfare 
policymaking.77
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A fourth and final set of alternative specifications involves alternative estimators. 
These include random intercept models with alternative embedding; alternative two-
level models using country-topic and country-wave as clusters; and three-level models 
involving country, topic, and year.78 We also considered random slope models (with 
attitude variables as the random coefficients) and ordinary least squares models with 
jackknifed standard errors. Although outlier analysis suggests that outliers are not 
influential, we also consider jackknife analysis to exclude particular country-topic-
years, country-years, or even countries.79 All these specifications yield stable support 
for Hypotheses 1a and 2a with respect to generosity-based but not spending-based 
measures; they also therefore support Hypotheses 1b and 2b.
Conclusion
This article has explored representation and equality of representation in welfare 
state development. Our analysis has provided somewhat mixed but broadly supportive 
Table 6. Rich-Minus-Poor Support and Change in Welfare State Generosity, T + 1 to T + 4.
P5/P95 P10/P90 Quintile 1/5 Tercile 1/3
Pooled (N = 130)
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Note: Each cell represents the key result of a separate regression estimation (controls and full results 
not shown). “Baseline specification” is the same as in Tables 1 and 3–5; “+ median preference” is 
the baseline specification plus extra control for country-topic-year preference of median income 
respondents.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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evidence for our central hypotheses that public opinion guides political outcomes and 
that the preferences of the rich have more weight in the policy process than the prefer-
ences of the poor. Measures of welfare spending show only weak support for our 
hypotheses, with the support most visible with respect to pension spending. By con-
trast, our analysis of the benefit-generosity measures unearths a stark pattern of real 
but unequal representation in welfare state reform. We believe that the results for ben-
efit generosity are likely to be the more inferentially valid, as they better capture the 
regulatory and legislative program changes citizens have in mind when they express 
support for more or less welfare state effort. From that point of view our evidence is 
strong and important. However, spending measures are also relevant gauges of wel-
fare-policy effort, and we take seriously the mixed results in these specifications. We 
frame our end judgments as qualified support for the view that welfare policymaking 
in advanced democracies involves real but unequal substantive representation.
Further research can test and extend these findings to clarify the politics of repre-
sentation. The data’s leverage for exploring (inequalities in) representation between 
countries, time periods, and policy areas can be improved and expanded. We are par-
ticularly interested in differences across institutional and welfare state settings—such 
as between proportional representation and majoritarian systems, or between liberal 
and more social-democratic welfare state systems. We are also interested in exploring 
the mechanisms that produce unequal representation, which our data cannot clarify 
and which remain hotly contested.80 Finally, we should investigate unequal representa-
tion with respect to inequalities in areas other than income, such as education.81 In the 
meantime, our study provides broader and more valid evidence than is found in exist-
ing work that we can expect genuine, but also unequal, representation of citizen atti-
tudes in the development of welfare states in industrialized democracies.
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